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Abstract. The present study analyses the rules of the new Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as CCP) 
on access to information and evidence on the basis of the provisions of the draft bill submitted to the Parliament 
(draft bill no. T/11900).
The new CCP reiterates that the main objective is the impartial adjudication of cases, which is to be achieved 
by ensuring the effectiveness of proceedings, strengthening the parties’ obligation to tell the truth within a fair 
trial, introducing a split system of proceedings and the court’s contributive actions, obliging both parties, as a 
general rule, to be represented by a legal representative (the high courts’ model), regulating the means of electronic 
communication and strengthening the parties’ right to dispose of the taking of evidence.
During the examination of the topic of the taking of evidence, I had been concerned about the issue of what 
are the parties’ true expectations from the judicial system and to what extent the legislator is able to live up to 
them. The parties expect from the courts to reveal the truth in order to provide compensation for the damage 
suffered by them, and the new CCP seeks to meet this social expectation within the framework of the parties’ 
factual allegations. The issue of whether the parties’ allegations are true is of essential nature in the proceedings, 
and based on their assessment the court should deliver a just (true to the facts) judgement. Following the court’s 
judgement, the case adjudged – on the basis of the legal premise of Ulpian: ‘Res iudicata pro veritate accipitur’ – 
must be taken for truth. The new regulation aims to ensure the implementation and enforceability of those 
procedural requirements that are related to the objective of evidence taking (the court has to become convinced of 
the veracity of the parties’ allegations) and the parties’ interests in the taking of evidence (the parties seek to 
convince the court).
Keywords: Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure, codification, concentration of proceedings, split structure of 
proceedings, exigency of alleging facts and providing evidence, electronic communication, taking of evidence, 
methods and means of evidence taking
1. INTRODUCTION
‘Act no. III of 1952 on the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as CCP) 
provides a legal framework for 200 to 230 thousand civil proceedings a year, and it 
constitutes a legislative background for more than one million non-litigious proceedings a 
year, thus the CCP represents the leading source of law within the Hungarian legal system. 
In its Government Decision no. 1267/2013 of 17 May 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Government Decision), the Government decided to elaborate a new Code of Civil Procedure 
in order to create a new procedural framework that is better suited to the more complex 
legal disputes of the 21st century. According to the Government Decision, the codification 
aims at drafting a modern Code of Civil Procedure aligned with international practices and 
standards, which ensures the effective implementation of substantive rights and regulates 
procedural relations in a transparent and coherent manner with regard to the latest results of 
the legal literature and the courts’ jurisprudence as well as to technical progress, thereby 
facilitating the participation of legal professionals and citizens seeking justice in civil 
proceedings’.1
      *  Senior lecturer, University of Pécs, Faculty of Law, Department of Criminal and Civil 
Procedural Law. E-mail: kiraly.lilla@ajk.pte.hu 
1 Commentary to the general explanatory memorandum of the Draft Bill.
52 LILLA KIRÁLY
In April 2016, a draft proposal on the new Code of Civil Procedure elaborated by the 
Ministry of Justice2 (hereinafter referred to as the MoJ draft proposal on the new CCP) was 
uploaded to the website ‘kormany.hu’,3 the publication of which was preceded by a three-
year long codification work. The codification started under the leadership of Professor János 
Németh,4 while the second phase of the work5 was carried out under the guidance of Tamás 
Éless6 and István Varga7. The two work phases8 resulted in two voluminous publications 
and involved one hundred and twenty excellent Hungarian legal experts on procedural law 
who worked at the request of Professor János Németh.
At the end of the first phase, a collection of studies entitled ‘Egy új Polgári Perrendtartás 
alapjai’ (The foundations of a new Code of Civil Procedure)9 was published, which 
‘constituted an important cornerstone in the preparation of the codification of the new Code 
of Civil Procedure: the preparatory phase ordered by the Government Decision and aiming 
at presenting, with scientific depth, the potential directions and methods of codification has 
ended.10 The collection of studies that covers all the central fields of civil procedural law 
not only documents the large professional debate on the preparations of the codification, but 
served as one of the bases for the subsequent public debate and the drafting of the new 
piece of legislation as well’.11
At the end of the second phase, a work entitled ‘The draft version of the provisions 
and explanatory memorandum of the new Code of Civil Procedure as elaborated by the 
experts of the Working Committee on the New Code of Civil Procedure’ (hereinafter 
referred to as the Experts’ Draft Proposal on the new CCP)12 was delivered,13 which was 
followed by the draft proposal of the Ministry of Justice, published on the website ‘www.
kormany.hu’.
  2 Draft proposal on the new Code of Civil Procedure, 11 April 2016.
  3 http://www.kormany.hu/download/c/4c/a0000/20160411%20Pp%20el%C5%91terjesz 
t%C3%A9s_honlapra.pdf, accessed 11 May 2016.
  4 Professor emeritus, ELTE University, Faculty of Law, Department of Civil Procedural Law, 
chair of the Principal Committee on the Codification of Civil Procedural Law and of the Drafting 
Committee on the Codification of Civil Procedural Law, both of these committees have been set up by 
Government Decision no. 1267/2013 of 17 May 2013 on the Codification of Civil Procedural Law.
  5 On the three-year long codification work, see Varga (2015) 20–32.
  6 Honorary university professor, ELTE University, Faculty of Law, Department of Civil 
Procedural Law, member of the Drafting Committee on the Codification of Civil Procedural Law.
  7 Department head, university professor, ELTE University, Faculty of Law, Department of 
Civil Procedural Law, scientific secretary of the Principal Committee on the Codification of Civil 
Procedural Law.
  8 On the preparation and consequences of the codification work, see Cserba (2013) 9–18; the 
period of the two work phases: the years 2013–2014 and 2014–2015.
  9 Németh and Varga (2014).
10 The concept of the new Code of Civil Procedure – commissioned on the basis of the 
Government Decision – was adopted by the Government on 14 January 2015.
11 http://hvgorac.hu/egy_uj_polgari_perrendtartas_alapjai_kiadvany accessed 6 June 2017.
12 Éless and Varga (2015), (hereinafter referred to as the Experts’ Draft Proposal on the new 
CCP), 1025 page-long manuscript.
13 The drafters handed over their proposal to the Minister of Justice on 30 October 2015.
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After an extremely short public debate,14 the MoJ draft proposal was presented to the 
Government in the second quarter of 2016, and the Parliament started to discuss the draft 
bill on the new Code of Civil Procedure (draft bill no. T/11900, hereinafter referred to as 
the Draft Bill on the new CCP) on 3 September 2016.
2. PRINCIPLES RELATED TO THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE
Point 2, entitled ‘Basic Premises’ of the first part of the draft proposal enumerates the five 
main principles of civil proceedings, four of them are directly linked to the taking of 
evidence: the principle of the concentration of proceedings (section 3), the parties’ 
obligation to assist the court in administering justice and to tell the truth (section 4), the 
principle of good faith (section 5) and the court’s contributive actions (section 6).
The concentration of proceedings, the parties’ obligation to assist the court in 
administering justice and the court’s contributive actions are the three pillars of the new 
CCP contributing to the systemic assurance of the effectiveness of proceedings.15 The new 
CCP seeks to ensure an optimal co-ordination between the parties’ actions and the court’s 
tasks by the structural arrangements of proceedings, in particular by the firm and consistent 
handling of the plaintiff’s statement of claims and by the determination of the legal and 
material framework of civil proceedings divided to a preparatory phase and a phase dealing 
with the merits of the case.16
In civil proceedings, it is the plaintiff who is entitled to initiate an action (the 
dispositive principle) and the court is bound by the plaintiff’s statement of claims and the 
substantive rights claimed therein (the principle that the parties delimit the subject matter of 
the proceedings) and makes use in the taking of evidence only of those pieces of evidence 
that had been submitted or proposed by the plaintiff or the defendant (the parties’ obligation 
to produce evidence),17 in addition, the court may freely use the parties’ arguments as 
evidence or any other piece of evidence to establish the case’s factual background (the 
principle of the free establishment of facts).
In civil proceedings, the court’s judgement either enables the plaintiff to enforce his 
well-founded claim or protects the defendant against the plaintiff’s ill-founded claim, and 
the court administers justice within the framework of the rules set forth for the parties to 
comply with their duty to carry out their procedural acts in a timely manner.18 The 
effectiveness of proceedings – viewed in conjunction with the courts’ adjudicating process 
(activities) – means that the courts should take all the necessary measures in due time to 
14 As of April 2016, the MoJ draft proposal had been discussed at national level, mainly due 
to the co-operation and efforts of the National Office for the Judiciary and the Curia of Hungary, 
for instance, an international conference entitled ‘New Hungarian Civil Procedure Act and the 
Development of European Rules of Civil Procedure’ was held jointly by the Institute for Legal Studies 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the National Office for the Judiciary and the European Law 
Institute (UNIDROIT) at the Hungarian Judicial Academy on 30–31 May 2016 with the support of 
the Ministry of Justice.
15 See Szabó (2013) 365–76.
16 Zvolenszki (2016) 273.
17 Szalma (2016) 565–66.
18 Szabó (2013) 368 and 373; see also Magyary and Nizsalovszky (1939) 1–4.
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conclude the cases brought before them within a reasonable period of time, while – with a 
view to the results of proceedings (expediency) – it also means that the courts should seek 
to obtain the legal policy objectives set out by the legislator.19
2.1. The principle of the concentration of proceedings
The legal instrument of the concentration of proceedings is intended to identify the 
characteristics of the parties’ legal dispute as early as possible, to provide the court with all 
the facts and evidence necessary for the delivery of its judgement at the earliest opportunity, 
in other words, to determine, as early on as possible, the substantive and procedural legal 
framework of the legal dispute.20 The court and the parties should seek to have all the facts 
and evidence necessary for the delivery of the court’s judgement in such a time as to allow 
the court to dispose of the dispute, if possible, on one single hearing.21
‘The raison d’être of the substantive measures of organisation of procedure is to avoid 
the delivery of a decision that does not definitively settle the legal dispute:22 for this 
purpose, the court should endeavour to ensure that the parties put forward appropriately the 
essential facts necessary for the court’s decision and to provide the parties with all the 
information necessary for the establishment of the relevant facts and the proving thereof. 
The court’s contributive actions do not conflict with the dispositive principle and the parties’ 
obligation to produce evidence, since the parties are (may be) free to decide whether they 
wish to comply with the court’s ‘call’ or not, in the latter case, they have to bear the 
sanctions of their non-compliance as laid down in the detailed rules’.23
The principle of the concentration of proceedings appears to simply emphasise the 
importance of timeliness, however, it also implies the element of effectiveness, as one of 
the means of the acceleration of the adjudication of cases is the reduction of inputs (e.g. the 
court organises the questions to be addressed in a logical order, on the basis of which it 
does not allow the parties to bring forward such arguments that would be of relevance only 
as regards the case’s details to be examined at the later stages of proceedings).24
2.2.  The parties’ obligation to assist the court in administering justice  
and to tell the truth
If the party brings an action to the court, he becomes obligated to assist the court in dealing 
with his action, if he fails to comply with the above obligation, he has to bear the procedural 
consequences (preclusion, lack of proof etc.) of his non-compliance. This principle applies 
to all procedural acts, including the submission of statements, motions and pieces of 
evidence, as well as appearing at the court’s hearing.25
19 Szabó (2013) 368 and 370.
20 Commentary to section 3 of the Draft Bill.
21 Commentary to section 3 of the Draft Bill.
22 This requirement stems from the principle of ‘definitive dispute settlement’, defined in section 
2, subsection (1) of Act no. CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of the Courts 
(OAC Act).
23 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
24 Commentary to section 3 of the Draft Bill.
25 We can find this obligation also in the Act III of 1952 on the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP in 
force) section 141 subsection (2) ‘The court – if so required to ascertain the relevant facts of the case 
– order the parties to make their pleas and shall perform the taking of evidence procedure. The party 
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The new CCP specifically provides for the parties’ obligation to tell the truth.26 
‘Section 8 of the CCP in force regulates the obligation of the parties and their representatives 
to tell the truth as one of the elements of the obligation to pursue litigation in good faith, in 
addition, it also contains certain elements that fall within the scope of the exercise of rights 
in good faith, but go beyond the obligation to tell the truth, such as the prohibition of 
delaying the conclusion of proceedings and the prohibition of causing unnecessary 
expenses. On the basis of an approach different from the one taken in the CCP in force, the 
Draft Bill links up the parties’ obligation to assist the court in administering justice and 
their obligation to tell the truth, the latter being part of the former. One of the reasons for 
the above is that the different provisions of section 8 of the CCP in force have diverging 
personal fields of application. On one hand, section 8, subsection (1) of the CCP on ‘the 
exercise of rights under the principle of due course of the law’ and section 8, subsection (4) 
of the CCP on the prohibition of delaying the conclusion of proceedings apply to the parties 
and any other participants in the proceedings, on the other hand, section 8, subsection (3) of 
the CCP on the parties’ obligation to tell the truth (the prohibition of making false statements 
in court proceedings) is addressed only to the parties and their representatives. By virtue of 
the obligation to tell the truth, set forth by the Draft Bill, the parties are obligated to the 
reveal the truth only insofar as they wish to make a statement. The parties’ obligation to tell 
the truth includes active and passive statements of fact alike (allegation-disaffirmation). The 
obligation to tell the truth also applies to representatives and interveners who make an 
allegation or a statement. Since the allegations of other participants to proceedings, in 
particular witnesses and experts (deemed to be means of evidence) are treated differently, 
in terms of dogmatic positions, from the allegations of the parties, the former are subject 
to special rules (perjury, delivery of a false expert opinion, etc.) and special legal 
consequences’.27
Hence, there is a separation between the principle of good faith and the obligation to 
tell the truth in the new CCP: ‘the personal and material scope of the principle of good faith 
are broader than the obligation of the parties (and their representatives) to tell the truth. The 
requirement of pursuing litigation in good faith – as in the provisions of section 8, 
subsection (1) of the CCP in force – applies not only to the parties, but to other participants 
to proceedings as well: representatives, interveners, witnesses, experts, interpreters and, 
defined in broad terms, any other persons who may be entitled to participate in the court’s 
proceedings. The material scope of the principle of good faith is also wider than that of the 
obligation to tell the truth, because the former defines the requirement of the exercise of 
rights in good faith in a general way. The Draft Bill does not precisely identify what kind of 
acts, carried out by the parties or other participants to proceedings, could qualify as an 
exercise of rights in bad faith, and it provides a wide margin of discretion for the courts in 
shall present the facts, make his pleas and submit any supporting evidence in due time and in a timely 
manner as consistent with and pertaining to the status of case, and as the case progresses. If the taking 
of evidence cannot be performed in spite of this during the first hearing, the court may adjourn the 
hearing and order more elaborate preparations for the case.’
26 ‘The court impose a financial penalty upon the party, who – whether deliberately or as a 
result of gross negligence presented any facts to the case that later proved to be false.’ In section 4, 
subsection (4) of the Draft Bill.
27 Commentary to section 4 of the Draft Bill.
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respect of the assessment of such acts and the application of legal consequences attached 
thereto’.28
‘The obligation to assist the court in administering justice requires active participation 
from the parties: they are obligated to make relevant, adequate and concise statements, with 
also regard to cost-effectiveness. The parties’ obligation to assist the court in administering 
justice extends to the institution of proceedings, therefore the Draft Bill lays down higher 
criteria to be met by the plaintiff’s statement of claims as well’.29
‘For the purposes of achieving the objectives of civil proceedings, the obligation to 
pursue litigation in good faith means that the court, the parties and other participants of 
the proceedings have to co-operate with each other on the basis of the court’s duty of care 
and the various requirements imposed on the parties. This obligation is manifested in the 
exercise of rights under the principle of due course of the law and in the principle of acting 
in good faith, which also includes the prohibition of acting in bad faith’.30
2.3.  The court’s contributive actions (substantive measures of organisation  
of procedure)
One of the greatest challenges for today’s civil procedural law all over the world is 
effectiveness and speediness. In order to achieve this objective, legislators tend to introduce 
new legal institutions and carry out overall reforms affecting even the structure and role of 
the judiciary and the course of civil litigation. One of the ways legal disputes can be 
adjudicated within a reasonable time and soundly is to emphasise the role of the preparatory 
phase of the proceeding and make the parties more active in solving their dispute.31
‘The legal literature differentiates between substantive and procedural measures of 
organisation of procedure: the procedural measures of organisation of procedure include 
measures for the timing of the different phases of proceedings and for ensuring the 
continuity of proceedings (e.g. setting the date of a hearing, adjourning a hearing, setting 
deadlines, determining legal consequences related to procedural impediments, etc.), while 
the substantive measures of organisation of procedure affect the merits of the legal dispute 
(e.g. clarifying the case’s legal basis and factual background) and the substantive rights 
claimed by the parties’.32
The court’s contributive actions should effectively facilitate the exercise of the parties’ 
right to dispose of their legal action.33 The substantive measures of organisation of 
procedure are adopted by the court to organise its proceedings on the basis of the assessment 
of the substantive legal aspects of the parties’ statements and procedural acts. Such measures 
enable the court to detect the incoherence, deficiency or inconsistency of the parties’ 
initiative statements (legal and factual allegations, claims, pieces of evidence and motions) 
and to clarify them.
‘The substantive measures of organisation of procedure aim to ensure the availability 
of all the relevant facts and statements necessary for the court to decide on the case, 
primarily through the clarification of the parties’ allegations, but not without respect for the 
28 Commentary to section 5 of the Draft Bill.
29 Commentary to section 5 of the Draft Bill.
30 Herédi (2013) 92.
31 Ervo (2016) V.
32 Pákozdi (2014) 146.
33 Commentary to section 6 of the Draft Bill.
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parties’ right to dispose of their legal action, and by way of questioning, provision of 
information and call for the parties. With regard to the prominent implementation of the 
parties’ right to dispose of their legal action and the pronounced enforcement of their 
obligation to produce evidence, the Draft Bill completely reinterprets the provisions of 
section 3, subsection (3) of the CCP in force on the court’s tasks related to the taking of 
evidence and breaks with the approach according to which the court should provide all the 
parties to proceedings with exhaustive information on the taking of evidence in all cases. 
The parties’ right to dispose of their legal action entails that they are free to decide whether, 
in their procedural acts and statements, they wish to use and comply with the court’s 
substantive measures of organisation of procedure’.34
‘The material of the case file necessary for the court to conclude the case can be 
gathered in two different ways: in the ‘inquisitorial system’, the court is – at least in part – 
actively involved in investigating the facts of the case instead of the parties. In the 
‘adversarial system’, the court relies on the parties’ obligation to produce evidence on the 
basis of their right to dispose of their legal action, and the court may be entitled to take 
evidence ex officio only in exceptional cases defined by law.35 The substantive measures of 
organisation of procedure extend the scope of the adversarial system, since these measures 
(the court’s obligation to ask certain questions and to call the parties to carry out certain 
procedural acts, provision of information by the court, the court’s obligation to encourage 
the parties to settle their case by amicable agreement) may help those parties who are not 
familiar with the applicable legal provisions, are not skilled in handling their affairs or are 
not represented by an adequate legal representative to properly enforce their claims. By 
eliminating the risks and deficiencies of an excessive adversarial system, the substantive 
measures of organisation of procedure intend to safeguard the parties’ interests and protect 
the parties who make incomplete or unclear statements or put forward deficient or 
ambiguous petitions primarily due to their lack of legal expertise from losing out on the 
legal protection of which they are the beneficiaries based on the relevant substantive legal 
norms. The substantive measures of organisation of procedure are limited by the requirement 
of fair legal process. Such measures may be adopted by the court only insofar as the latter is 
capable of preserving the appearance of impartiality for the litigants’.36
At the end of the preparatory phase, the court provides the parties with general 
information on the facts that need to be proved and on which party has to bear the burden of 
proof. Upon the court’s call, the parties are obliged to put forward their motions for evidence 
within a deadline set by the court. The court does not take into account motions submitted 
out of time due to the parties’ fault.37 Till the end of the preparatory phase, the parties are 
entitled to modify their initiative statements – within the framework of the present Act – 
without the consent of their adversaries (modification of the statement of claims – 
modification of the counter-plea).38 The end of the preparatory phase, as part of the division 
of procedural phases, basically entails the prohibition of the modification of the statement 
of claims. The statement of claims is considered to be modified if the plaintiff changes the 
rights claimed in his statement of claims, which leads to the modification of the relevant 
facts, but not necessarily entails the modification of the plaintiff’s petition. Following the 
34 Commentary to section 237 of the Draft Bill.
35 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
36 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
37 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
38 Commentary to section 183 of the Draft Bill.
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end of the preparatory phase, such modification of the statement of claims is allowed only if 
the defendant gives his – explicit or tacit – consent to the modification. An unauthorised 
modification of the statement of claims qualifies as a withdrawal of the petition.39
The court may take evidence during the preparatory phase only in cases defined by 
law. This provision should be interpreted in compliance with the rules on the parties’ 
posterior motions for evidence, which allows it to be carried out between the delivery of a 
court order that closes the preparatory phase and the closure of the hearing phase before the 
delivery of the first instance judgement.40
‘According to the Draft Bill, initiative statements include pieces of evidence and 
motions for evidence, hence, the court has limited competence in the taking of evidence, 
and is obliged to intervene only when necessary, in particular if the parties submit 
incomplete initiative statements in relation to the relevant facts of the case or if there is a 
dispute between the parties as to which of them should bear the burden of proof as regards 
the given facts. The court informs the parties if the submitted evidence or motions for 
evidence do not cover all the essential facts, if the parties’ factual allegations are unclear, 
too general, inconsistent or incomplete or if there is a need to motion the court to take 
expert evidence. In the case of a dispute, the court informs the parties about the burden of 
proof resting on them and about the consequences of the failure to motion for the taking of 
evidence and an unsuccessful evidence taking.
The court’s substantive measures of organisation of procedure are limited by the 
statement of claims and the counter-plea, as well as by the rights claimed and the legal 
bases referred to by the parties. The system of substantive measures of organisation of 
procedure does not require the court to inform the parties if their factual allegations raise 
the necessity of the application of legal norms that have not been referred to in their claims 
and counter-pleas, in particular if such allegations would necessitate the modification of 
the claim, counter-plea or the rights claimed’.41 The above viewpoint is not shared by the 
members of the Meeting of the Heads of Councils of the Curia who considered it 
unfavourable and even unacceptable that ‘a statement of claims well-founded on the facts 
may be rejected on the basis of the sole fact that the plaintiff referred to the wrong legal 
title, such judicial practice is not compatible with the social mission of proceedings. The 
principle that the court is bound by the legal titles referred to by the parties is based on 
the misinterpretation of the principle that the parties delimit the subject matter of the 
proceedings: in reality, the court is only bound by the parties’ claims and factual allegations, 
but not by the legal titles referred to by them. It is the court that is given the task of 
qualifying the parties’ legal relationship based on their allegations and the pieces of 
evidence brought forward by them, since the proceedings’ principal issue is whether the 
plaintiff’s claims and factual allegations are well-founded, and not whether the legal 
grounds had been correctly put forward by the plaintiff’.42
39 Commentary to section 183 of the Draft Bill.
40 Commentary to section 220 of the Draft Bill.
41 Commentary to section 237 of the Draft Bill.
42 Letter of the Head of the Civil Department of the Curia, Mr. György Wellmann addressed to 
the President of the National Office for the Judiciary, 2015.E1.I.G.21/2., Budapest, 30 March 2015.
59ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND EVIDENCE ON THE BASIS OF THE DRAFT BILL...
The system of substantive measures of organisation of procedure does not further 
require the court to quest for, gather and assess facts and evidence ex officio within the 
framework of the parties’ claims, counter-pleas, the rights claimed and pieces of legislation 
referred to by them.43
Albeit with different intensity and content and to a different extent, the substantive 
measures of organisation of procedure are necessary in the preparatory phase, the phase 
dealing with the merits of the case and in second instance proceedings as well,44 because, as 
part of its contributive actions, the court is obliged to clarify the facts of the case and to 
determine the factual background of the legal dispute.45
2.4. The principle of the free establishment of facts
The principle of the free establishment of facts is regulated under the title ‘Basic provisions 
related to the taking of evidence’ in the chapter on the taking of evidence of Part 4 of the 
new CCP.46
‘The principle of free evidence taking – in a narrow sense – includes the freedom to 
choose any method for the taking of evidence and the freedom of the court to use any 
appropriate means (e.g. witness testimony, expert opinions, inspection and documents) as a 
piece of evidence. During the proceedings, other types of means of evidence or pieces of 
evidence that are not expressly defined by law may be freely assessed by the court: the 
different means of evidence have no predetermined – higher or lower – force of evidence. 
The system of free evidence taking enables the court to use any data, knowledge or 
information capable of establishing the facts relevant to the parties’ legal dispute as a piece 
of evidence. The means of evidence are regulated by procedural legal norms, which set 
certain formal requirements, for instance, private documents with full probative value have 
specific formal features defined by law, and these documents are given a higher force of 
evidence, even if the court is free to assess the evidentiary force of documents.47 In other 
cases, the use of images, video- and audio-recordings as pieces of evidence without the 
consent of the persons concerned is, in principle, prohibited due to personality rights issues. 
However, according to the courts’ case-law, an audio-recording may be made and used as a 
piece of evidence without the consent of the person concerned if the recording was carried 
out to prove the imminent threat or occurrence of an infringement on public interest or 
justified private interest grounds, provided that the making or use of the recording does not 
constitute a disproportionate interference in relation to the infringement to be proved.
The principle of the free establishment of facts – in a broader sense – means that the 
parties are obliged to prove the veracity of their allegations in court. Their veracity can be 
proved by other pieces of evidence, if the allegations are proved to be true, the court 
remains free to use them for the establishment of the relevant facts’.48
The negative side of the free establishment of facts is that the proceeding court is not 
bound by the decision of a State authority or other court and by the facts established therein 
43 Commentary to section 237 of the Draft Bill.
44 Commentary to section 237 of the Draft Bill.
45 See Köblös (2016) 185–204.
46 Section 263, subsections (1)–(2) of the new CCP.
47 See Constitutional Court decision No. 531/B/1997.
48 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
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in the establishment of the factual background of the case heard by the proceeding court 
and in the subsequent delivery of its decision, hence, there are no obstacles to a civil 
court establishing – on the basis of the assessment of all the pieces of evidence in its 
proceedings – a factual background different from the one found by a criminal court.49
3. RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN FIRST INSTANCE 
PROCEEDINGS AND THE PRELIMINARY TAKING OF EVIDENCE
3.1. The preparatory phase
The new CCP – on the basis of the split system of procedural phases introduced in first 
instance proceedings – separately regulates the preparatory phase and the phase dealing 
with the merits of the case. In the split system of proceedings, the preparatory phase aims at 
determining and clarifying the content and framework of the legal dispute in order to 
decisively define its factual and legal basis on the occasion of a single preparatory hearing 
following a detailed and comprehensive preparatory work in writing.50
One of the main legal effects of the end of the preparatory phase is that the pieces of 
evidence and motions for evidence submitted by the parties during that phase cannot 
subsequently be modified and no new evidence or motion for evidence put forward posterior 
can be accepted by the court, however, exceptions to this prohibition should be justified in 
cases like the ones where the modification of the statement of claims and counter-plea is 
allowed.51 As a result of the separation of the preparatory phase and the taking of evidence, 
in principle, no evidence can be taken during the preparatory phase. Evidence in relation to 
the merits of the case can be taken during the preparatory phase only in cases defined by the 
Draft Bill (e.g. gathering documents and data necessary for preparing the adjudication of 
the case upon the parties’ motions). The taking of evidence not in respect of the merits of 
the case is, nevertheless, not excluded (e.g. requirements of admissibility).52
‘In an ideal situation, the written preparatory work and the court’s contributive actions 
enable the court to have a fully prepared case file to be dealt with at the very first hearing. 
The preparatory hearing therefore starts with summarising the relevant initiative statements 
based on the results of the written preparations, prevents the court from misunderstanding 
or misinterpreting the parties’ statements and enables the court to verify whether it correctly 
interpreted the parties’ statements and intentions. In addition, the parties may present 
observations’.53
‘According to the Draft Bill, it is considered strictly necessary in the interest of 
ensuring the effectiveness of the preparatory hearing that the parties be present at the 
preparatory hearing and that the persons present be appropriately familiar with the facts of 
the case and its evidentiary issues. The Draft Bill seeks to guarantee the presence of parties 
49 BH 2003.457.
50 Trials should be as concentrated as possible to be effective. The Recommendation Rec. 84 (5) 
advises the establishment of a typical procedure based on “not more than two hearings, the first of 
which might be a preliminary hearing of a preparatory nature and the second for taking evidence, 
hearing arguments and, if possible, giving judgment.” European Commission for the Efficiency of 
Justice (CEPEJ), Compendium of “best practices” on time management of judicial proceedings, 
CEPEJ(2006)13, Strasbourg, 8. December 2006, point 4.3.
51 Commentary to section 220 of the Draft Bill.
52 Commentary to section 183 of the Draft Bill.
53 Commentary to section 183 of the Draft Bill.
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or representatives who are completely prepared to engage in the litigation by prohibiting the 
adjournment of the preparatory hearing on the grounds that the parties or their representatives 
did not take reasonable care to prepare for it. The writ summons has to contain a warning 
for the persons summoned of the consequences for failing to appear and be properly 
prepared’.54
‘The Draft Bill does in principle not differentiate between the high courts’ preparatory 
phase and the district courts’ preparatory phase (uniform rules of procedure). Following the 
submission of a written counter-plea (or eventually counter-claim or set-off), there are three 
ways to reach the conclusion of the preparatory phase:
1. the court may order the provision of further written documents,
2. the court may set the date of the preparatory hearing, or
3. the court may close the preparatory phase without ordering the parties to submit 
further written materials and without holding a preparatory hearing.
Thus, the court is given the competence to decide on the most appropriate method and 
procedural steps for preparing the case’s adjudication (in oral or written form), which 
should be adapted to the specificities of the particular case at hand’.55
‘Based on the schedule of procedural phases contained in the Draft Bill, in a significant 
number of the cases, the court may have to hold only one preparatory hearing to close the 
preparatory phase, and it may be able to start dealing with the merits of the case and taking 
substantive evidence either already at the preparatory hearing or at a subsequent hearing at 
the latest’.56
‘There may be cases in which there is absolutely no need to hold a preparatory hearing 
or to order the provision of further written materials, because the legal dispute is not 
complicated at all (e.g. the defendant recognises the plaintiff’s claims). In such cases, the 
preparation of the case’s adjudication can be carried out without holding a hearing,57 but the 
court has to issue a prior warning and enable the parties to request the court to hold a 
hearing. If no preparatory hearing is held by the court, then the latter proceeds to close the 
preparatory phase by delivering an out-of-hearing order the content and legal effects of 
which are identical to the one rendered at a preparatory hearing. The date of the court’s on-
the-merits hearing has to be fixed at the same time as the order to close the preparatory 
phase is delivered’.58
‘The preparatory phase is closed by the court’s formal order that is not subject to 
appeal and declares the closure of the preparatory phase. As regards this type of court order, 
the Draft Bill states that, despite being a procedural order, it binds the court that is not 
allowed to modify it.59 Procedural acts to be performed during the preparatory phase can be 
54 Commentary to sections 188 and 189 of the Draft Bill.
55 Commentary to section 187 of the Draft Bill.
56 Commentary to section 192 of the Draft Bill.
57 The rules on “Questioning the parties without holding a hearing” (section 155 of the new 
CCP) serve the purpose of allowing the proceeding court to gather information, request clarification 
or call for the delivery of a statement from the parties without holding a hearing, which basically 
extends the court’s scope of action in respect of the written preparation of the case’s adjudication to 
the on-the-merits phase of proceedings. The Draft Bill provides for the use of such action by the court 
only in case of parties acting without a legal representative, since those who are represented by a legal 
representative have to submit their statements in writing.
58 Commentary to sections 197 and 198 of the Draft Bill.
59 Éless and Ébner (2014) 377–92.
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carried out at the subsequent stages of proceedings only in cases and under conditions laid 
down by the Draft Bill’.60
‘In the context of the substantive measures of organisation of procedure, the Draft Bill 
provides additional and different types of assistance to parties acting without a legal 
representative. Lay persons may need to be heard in person to clarify their initiative 
statements, be assisted in exploring their opportunities in the area of evidence taking, and 
be informed, in respect of the facts to be proven, about the possible means of evidence, 
methods of proof and the conditions of evidence taking in terms of procedural law’.61
‘Additional preparatory measures may need to be taken in case of the extension of the 
statement of claims and the submission of a set-off as well. These additional measures 
extend only to the modified parts of the claims and petitions, which means that the entire 
preparatory phase does not have to be re-opened. The Draft Bill does not contain specific 
provisions to regulate the deadlines, methods (in oral or written form) and steps of the 
taking of additional preparatory measures. The court is free to decide on the most 
appropriate method of taking additional preparatory measures on the basis of the case’s 
specific circumstances and the nature, extent and importance of the petitions’ modification’.62
3.2. The on-the-merits phase
‘In the split system of procedural phases, the second phase serves the purposes of taking 
evidence – relevant to the legal dispute identified in the preparatory phase – and delivering 
a decision on the merits of the case.
In this procedural phase, the parties are given the opportunity to modify or supplement 
– within the applicable legal framework, in a relatively free manner and without the consent 
of their adversaries – their initiative statements in compliance with their obligation to assist 
the court in administering justice and to tell the truth and with the principle of good faith. 
The party who makes an initiative statement or modifies his earlier statement only in the 
on-the-merits phase despite having been given the opportunity to do so in the preparatory 
phase is deemed to fail to engage in a reasonably expected procedural conduct. To prevent 
the parties from engaging in such misconduct, the Draft Bill provides for the possibility of 
imposing a fine on them’. As a result of the preparatory phase, the court has to carry out 
targeted and, in many cases, scheduled measures of evidence taking in the on-the-merits 
phase, therefore the Draft Bill states that the court is also entitled to fix several on-the-
merits hearing dates at the same time, and such hearings can be held on consecutive days as 
well.63
60 Commentary to section 194 of the Draft Bill.
61 Commentary to section 253 of the Draft Bill.
62 Commentary to section 222 of the Draft Bill.
63 Commentary to section 183 of the Draft Bill.
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In the on-the-merits – oral – phase, no further evidence or motion for evidence can be 
submitted, and the court is given the task of taking evidence and delivering a decision on 
the merits of the case, preferably at a single on-the-merits hearing.64
The Draft Bill restricts, inter alia, the submission of evidence and motion for evidence 
from among the different initiative statements, hence, the closure of the preparatory phase 
essentially leads to the fixing of the framework of evidence taking. ‘No other pieces of 
evidence than the ones available at the court’s hearing and capable of immediately 
establishing the veracity of contested allegations or immediately disproving the statement 
of claims can be assessed by the court’.65
The presence of the parties at on-the-merits hearings is not indispensable, thus, the 
Draft Bill – by changing the relevant provisions of the CCP in force, which favour only the 
plaintiff – makes it possible for any of the parties, including the defendant to request the 
court to hold an on-the-merits hearing in their absence.66
3.3. The preliminary taking of evidence
In civil proceedings, evidence is taken in the light of the plaintiff’s statement of claims and 
the defendant’s counter-plea in order to establish the relevant facts and verify the contested 
allegations. However, there may be cases where a fact or circumstance needs to be proven 
prior to the beginning of proceedings or prior to the court’s first hearing, for instance, if 
there is a danger that, as time passes, the taking of evidence could not be carried out or 
could be carried out only with great difficulty. Within the framework of the preliminary 
taking of evidence, the court can order the preliminary hearing of a witness who, for 
instance, faces imminent death due to health reasons or wishes to settle down abroad. 
A preliminary inspection can be held if an important document starts to become illegible or 
there is a risk that the on-the-spot traces would soon disappear (e.g. winter snow is 
expected). Expert opinions are the most commonly used means of preliminary evidence in 
cases where the establishment of the relevant facts of the legal dispute requires special 
expertise.67
The preliminary taking of evidence may significantly simplify and thus shorten the 
proceedings, or, in the optimistic case, may avoid them if, for instance, the preliminary 
expert opinion on a disputed issue is accepted by both parties who are then able to conclude 
an out-of-court settlement. The preliminary taking of evidence may take place – upon 
request – either prior to the beginning of court proceedings or in the preparatory phase.68
64 Those foreign civil procedural codes that recognise the principle of the concentration of 
proceedings define its meaning, similarly to the new CCP, by the requirement to adjudicate and 
conclude a case at a single on-the-merits hearing, see, for instance, section 7 of the Lithuanian Code 
of Civil Procedure, and section 272, subsection (1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure. This 
requirement was present in section 224 of the 1911 Code of Civil Procedure drafted by Sándor Plósz 
and also stems from section 141, subsection (1) of the CCP in force. Commentary to section 3 of the 
Draft Bill.
65 Commentary to section 214 of the Draft Bill.
66 Commentary to section 223 of the Draft Bill.
67 Király and Füzy (2005) 80–91.
68 Commentary to section 334 of the Draft Bill.
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The findings of the preliminary taking of evidence may be used by any of the parties 
in the subsequent proceedings. It is therefore not excluded that the party refers to the 
favourable findings of a preliminary taking of evidence requested by the other party.69
4. THE RULES OF THE NEW CCP ON THE TAKING AND ASSESSMENT  
OF EVIDENCE
4.1.  The parties’ autonomy to allege facts and the method of the court’s monopoly  
to establish the case’s facts: the court’s discretionary power
The main element of the court’s hearings is the taking of evidence, hence, an efficient 
evidence taking is vital to the well-functioning adjudication of cases by the court.70 The 
court should not seek to reveal the truth,71 but to ensure the fairness of proceedings: it 
should endeavour to establish the facts of the case by respecting the parties’ right to dispose 
of their legal action.72 On the basis of their private autonomy and right to dispose of their 
own legal action, the parties are also given the right to choose the facts that they wish to 
share with the court and which they refer to so as to request legal protection from the 
court.73 The parties are obliged to allege only those facts that ‘based on the law, are capable, 
if proven to be true, of supporting their claim for the enforcement of their substantive 
rights’.74
Within the framework of the parties’ motions for evidence, the court is free to decide 
on the methods and means of evidence taking, as well as on the scope and chronological 
order of the individual measures for the taking of evidence.75 The principle of free evidence 
taking has three main elements in relation to the court’s discretionary power in the 
establishment of facts:
1. ‘The principle of free assessment of evidence directly stems from the principle of 
free evidence taking. The court assesses whether the parties’ factual allegations are 
supported by the pieces of evidence submitted by them or not. The facts established by the 
court are in conformity with the relevant procedural rules if the former are in line with the 
documents of the case file and are based on reasonable and correct conclusions. The 
assessment of evidence is, nevertheless, bound by certain constraints, such as legal 
presumptions or a legal provision that states that a certain circumstance should be considered 
true in the absence of proof to the contrary or lays out that where property rights stemming 
from a criminal proceeding that is considered to have been finally disposed of are to be 
decided in a civil action, the court may not declare in its decision the sentenced person not 
guilty of the criminal act as charged’.76
69 Commentary to section 338 of the Draft Bill.
70 Légrádi (2014) 443–73.
71 “A distinction should be made between seeking legal truth (formal truth) and seeking 
substantive truth. The former means that the court examines the veracity of only those factual 
allegations that are contested by the parties, while it accepts the remainder of their allegations without 
questioning them. The latter entails that the court seeks to reveal the whole truth in the genuine sense 
of the word.” Farkas (1956) 24–25.
72 Kengyel (2014) 289.
73 Éless and Parlagi (2014) 358.
74 Éless and Parlagi (2014) 358–59.
75 Commentary to section 278 of the Draft Bill.
76 Commentary to section 279 of the Draft Bill.
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2. ‘A distinction has to be made between the free assessment of evidence by the court 
and the court’s discretionary decision-making, on the basis of which the court is entitled to 
determine the amount of damages or any other claim to be awarded at its own discretion, 
after weighing all circumstances of the case, provided that it cannot be established based on 
the opinions of experts or other evidence. The court is given the power to do so only if the 
amount to be awarded cannot be established by way of evidence taking. This discretionary 
power cannot be exercised if the relevant fact could be proven by the party, but the latter 
fails to submit a motion for evidence or the evidence taken does not support the party’s 
factual allegation.’77 The principle of discretionary decision-making does not apply to cases 
in which the court may take evidence ex officio.
3. ‘The court’s freedom in respect of the assessment of evidence also extends to the 
parties’ factual allegations: the court does not automatically consider the parties’ undisputed 
allegations (concurrent allegations, acknowledgements) true, as it checks them against 
common knowledge, common experience and its official knowledge, and examines their 
internal coherence, i.e. it assesses them. There are cases in which the party’s factual 
allegation is an essential element of the taking of evidence, that is why the CCP provides 
for the compulsory hearing of the party concerned (e.g. in actions for the establishment of 
origin78). In the process of the establishment of the case’s facts, the court is entitled to 
assess not only the parties’ allegations, but their procedural conduct as well.’79
The court assesses not only the results of the taking of evidence, but the process of 
evidence taking as well: it decides on whether the means of evidence proposed is capable of 
proving the veracity of the factual allegation to be proved or whether the piece of evidence 
can be used in court (e.g. the presence of grounds for prohibiting the taking or assessment 
of evidence, the pieces of evidence have been obtained or used unlawfully).
‘Since a conclusive break with the requirement of ensuring the discovery of substantive 
truth,80 courts have been required to satisfy themselves with a degree of certainty that 
excludes any reasonable doubts, one of the reasons behind the changed requirement is 
that expert opinions, more and more necessary for deciding on the merits of the legal 
dispute, are usually delivered with a certain level of certainty or that the court’s degree of 
certainty may vary depending on the type of the legal action, for instance, in actions that 
affect the legal status of the litigants (civil status actions, actions for the establishment of 
origin, certain family law and guardianship actions, etc.), a higher degree of certainty is 
required, while in other types of actions, a lower level of certainty may also be sufficient, 
however, an objectively set minimum degree of certainty has to be achieved in all types of 
cases’.81
The court’s conviction is subjective in the sense that it results from the proceeding 
court’s intellectual activity aimed at getting to know the case’s factual background and 
77 Commentary to section 279 of the Draft Bill.
78 BH 1984.453., BH 1983.196.
79 We can find this also in the Act III of 1952 on the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP in force) 
Section 206 subsection (2) “Upon weighing the facts based on the case file, the court shall determine, 
also according to its conviction, the relevance that the party’s failure to appear may have as to the 
judgment of the case, or the party’s or his counsel’s non-compliance with any request, or the relevance 
of their refusal to answer a question, or their pleading to having no knowledge or recollection of 
certain specific facts.” 
80 Act no. CX of 1999 on the modification of Act no. III of 1952 on the Code of Civil Procedure.
81 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
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making conclusions based on it, nonetheless, this conviction should not originate from a 
‘peculiar’ intellectual process or from ‘a kind of unclear emotional process or a general 
assumption.82
4.2. Unlawful means of evidence
‘One of the characteristics of civil proceedings, as opposed to criminal proceedings, is that 
the production of evidence is, in principle, the task of the litigants (natural or legal persons 
etc.) who gather the pieces of information and evidence submitted to the court typically but 
not exclusively as natural persons and outside the framework of the court’s proceedings: the 
theoretical and jurisdictional problem in that case is that the parties may try to use means of 
evidence produced out of the court unlawfully in terms of the relevant substantive legal 
norms’.83
Due to the emergence and widespread use of new information, communication and 
multimedia devices, a growing tendency has been seen in the context of the possibility and 
actual practice of gathering pieces of information and evidence in an unlawful manner.84
In the courts’ practice, the question of whether an illicit piece of evidence or a piece of 
evidence obtained unlawfully can be used by the court is raised more and more frequently. 
In most of the cases, such evidence includes secret picture and sound recordings.85
The legal literature has elaborated three theories in respect of the usability of illicit 
means of evidence. According to the first theory, it follows from the principle of free 
evidence taking that a procedural act that is not prohibited by law can be freely carried out, 
therefore the unlawfully obtained pieces of evidence can be freely used; by virtue of the 
second theory, there is an absolute prohibition on the use of illicit evidence in civil 
proceedings. The third and most widespread theory – approved at international level as well 
– is based on the so-called principle of reciprocity, according to which the different 
interests – the party’s legitimate private interests in evidence taking or the protection of the 
other party’s personality rights – have to be weighed against each other in every case, and 
the court must when weighing those interests have due regard to the degree of unlawfulness 
of the obtaining and use of evidence.86 As the courts’ case-law and the legal literature opted 
for the principle of reciprocity in relation to the usability of illicit means of evidence, the 
Draft Bill has to find a suitable solution between an absolute legal prohibition on and the 
complete admissibility of illicit evidence, and has to enable the court to exercise a 
discretionary power in that regard.87
‘The exclusion of illicit means of evidence from the taking of evidence may make it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the parties to submit their pieces of evidence. The 
principle of good faith and the parties’ obligation to assist the court in administering justice 
require from the parties to act in a lawful manner and support the enforcement of rights. 
In the event, then, that there is a lawful method to produce evidence (it is objectively not 
82 Németh and Kiss (2010) 778.
83 Papp (2013) 298–99.
84 Commentary to section 269 of the Draft Bill, BH 1993.365. 
85 An unlawfully produced audio-recording may be used as a piece of evidence in court only if 
this recording is the only available means of evidence capable of enabling the court to establish the 
case’s facts and reveal the truth (BH 2015.38.)
86 Kengyel (1995) 408–10; Nagy (2015).
87 Papp (2011).
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impossible), even if that method is more difficult or more complicated than the unlawful 
method, the parties have to choose the lawful way of producing evidence.
The main advantage of the application of the rules on the exigency of providing 
evidence is that the opposing party is given an option: he either approves of the use of illicit 
means of evidence by subsequently renouncing to object to the unlawfulness of evidence or 
giving his authorisation or consent to the use thereof, or takes the consequences of the 
exigency of providing evidence, which ultimately prevents the means of evidence from 
being used at an open court hearing’.88
4.3. The use of the results of an evidence taking carried out in other proceedings
There are many cases in which the very same fact (set of facts) has relevance and needs to 
be proven in more than one proceeding. The taking of evidence on the same fact in different 
proceedings would be contrary to the principal requirements of economy of procedure and 
concluding a case within a reasonable time. The CCP in force also provides for the 
possibility of using evidence taken in other proceedings,89 and the courts have so far seized 
the opportunity to do so, but there is no express and unambiguous legal provision as to the 
evidentiary force of the proofs gathered in such way.
In practice, the courts sought to circumvent the cumbersome provisions: ‘if a person 
had already been heard as a witness in other proceedings, then the proceeding court did not 
hear the same witness again in detail, but instead it made him state whether he wished to 
maintain his earlier witness testimony delivered in other proceedings or not, moreover, the 
summoning of such witness is compulsory only if the proceeding court detects a discrepancy 
in the witness’ earlier testimony, and the discrepancy needs to be resolved at the proceeding 
court’s hearing’.90
Judicial practice has already established that an expert opinion delivered in other 
proceedings can also be used by the proceeding court, provided that such opinion is 
appropriately presented at the proceeding court’s hearing and the parties are given the 
opportunity to comment on it.91
‘However, with a view to the differences of the detailed rules of the various types of 
procedures, the guarantees of the Code of Civil Procedure aimed at ensuring the 
appropriateness of evidence taking cannot be disregarded: for instance, all the parties to the 
proceedings have to be given the possibility of being present at the hearing of a witness and 
addressing questions to him, the witness should be able exercise his right to be exempted 
from delivering a testimony, the expert opinion should be prepared by an expert enlisted in 
the registry of forensic experts, etc. On the other hand, there is no procedural interest that 
would require the court to comply with all the procedural rules on the taking of evidence, 
including to take evidence itself. The court incorporates those pieces of evidence that have 
been gathered in other proceedings into its case file by presenting them at its hearing.’92
88 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
89 Section 124, subsection (4), point a) of the CCP in force expressively enables the court to 
request documents from other authorities and bodies in the process of the preparation of the court’s 
hearing.
90 BH 1993.748. 
91 BH 1984.445., BH 2000.208., BDT 2006.1483. 
92 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
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4.4. Rejection of a motion for evidence
The court may reject a motion for evidence on three main grounds defined in the CCP in 
force: failure to submit a motion for evidence within the specified time limit, submission of 
a motion for evidence in bad faith and the evidence proposed is unnecessary for passing a 
decision on the merits of the case.93 Additional grounds for rejection in relation to 
supplementary motions for evidence may be the followings: the evidence taking proposed 
by the party, not necessarily in bad faith, would be capable of unduly delaying the 
conclusion of proceedings, unnecessarily increasing the costs of proceedings or leading to 
the excessive and burdensome mobilisation of witnesses.94
Factual allegations do not need to be proved if they are allegations left to the discretion 
of the party concerned, are based on acknowledgement, the parties’ concurrent or undisputed 
statements, common knowledge or the court’s official knowledge, or qualify as legal 
presumptions – including allegations that are based on facts that should be considered true 
by virtue of the law in the absence of proof to the contrary, i.e. temporarily true allegations – 
against which, however, counter-evidence may be produced.95 These types of allegations 
enable the court to consider certain facts relevant to the legal dispute true and use them as a 
basis for the delivery of its decision.
According to the Draft Bill, the court may reject a motion for evidence, on one hand, 
on the grounds defined in the CCP in force (the evidence proposed is unnecessary for 
passing a decision on the merits of the case, or the party fails to comply with his obligation 
to advance the costs of an evidence taking proposed by him) and, on the other hand, on a 
new ground (the motion for evidence does not include all the elements required by law).96 
In addition to these grounds for rejection, the court is bound by the prohibition of using 
illicit means of evidence.
The Draft Bill introduces, as a new element, the possibility of rejecting a motion for 
evidence on the grounds of economy of procedure. Thus, a necessary and possible, but 
uneconomical taking of evidence may be rejected by the court (e.g. legal expenses are many 
times in excess of the amount of the plaintiff’s claim).The above ground for rejection 
cannot be applied in legal actions where the law allows ex officio evidence taking.
4.5.  The rules on the exigency of alleging facts and the exigency  
of providing evidence
The parties are under the exigency of alleging facts in the preparatory phase, while they are 
under the exigency of providing evidence in the on-the-merits phase.97
93 “Rejection of a motion if, for instance, the evidence proposed is not related to the relevant 
facts of the case, is related to them, but they can be verified without any taking of evidence, or if the 
veracity of the facts to be proven has already been justified by the court via other means of evidence, 
or if it is already unlikely or impossible that the taking of evidence would be successful” in BDT 
2002.657.
94 “European Court of Human Rights considers that the competent national authorities were 
required by Article 6 § 1 to act with particular diligence in ensuring the progress of the proceedings”. 
see Bock v. Germany, judgment of 29 March 1989, Series A no. 150, p. 23, § 49 in case of Mikulić v. 
Croatia (Application no. 53176/99) judgment, Strasbourg, 7. February 2002.
95 Commentary to section 266 of the Draft Bill.
96 Commentary to sections 272–74 of the Draft Bill.
97 New CCP, section 184, subsections (1)–(2): exigency of alleging facts, section 265: interests 
in producing evidence and exigency of providing evidence.
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‘The legislator provides for the rules on the newly introduced exigency of alleging 
facts within the scope of the preparatory phase. The exigency of alleging facts is based on 
the understanding that, in certain information-asymmetric situations, the party, without any 
fault on his part, may not be aware of all the pieces of information necessary for the 
enforcement of his substantive rights, therefore he is unable to make precise factual 
allegations, while the opposing party is in the possession of the missing information, but it 
is not in his interest to reveal them in the proceedings.
The main reason behind the introduction of the exigency of alleging facts is that in 
such situations the party under the exigency of alleging facts and the court are exempted 
from the obligation to reveal those circumstances of the case that are affected by the 
exigency, and the missing elements can be considered as proved facts. The Draft Bill, 
however, does not oblige the court to abide by the above rule if the court has reasonable 
doubts as to its application, similarly to the provisions related to the acceptance of the 
veracity of the parties’ concurrent and undisputed statements and their acknowledgements’.98
‘The exigency of alleging facts has to be applied if only the party having adverse 
interests is in the possession of the pieces of information necessary for making a factual 
allegation. It cannot be applied, nonetheless, if a third party having no interests in the 
proceedings is also familiar with such information.
A mere reference to the existence of the exigency of alleging facts is not enough for 
the application of the rules related to it, but no taking of evidence is expected in that regard. 
The Draft Bill obliges the party who seeks to refer to the exigency of alleging facts to partly 
make its existence probable and partly verify its existence’.99
The party is under the exigency of alleging facts if a) he makes it probable that the 
pieces of information necessary for making factual allegations are in the exclusive 
possession of the opposing party, b) he verifies that he has taken the necessary measures to 
get and retain these pieces of information, c) the opposing party does not disclose the 
information despite having been requested by the court to do so, and d) the opposing party 
does not make it probable that the requirements as provided for under points a) and b) are 
not met.100
By virtue of the requirement of pursuing litigation in good faith, the parties are 
expected to give an account to the court of the relevant pieces of information that they are 
aware of – regardless of the general and special rules on the taking of evidence –, and to 
provide the court with the pieces of evidence available to them.101 This is the so-called 
secondary obligation to allege facts, which is of secondary nature not only because it is 
incumbent (in a secondary manner) on the adversary of the party interested in alleging 
certain facts, but also because it is exclusively related to the so-called secondary facts. The 
parties are obliged to allege all the facts that distinguish the substantive rights claimed by 
them from other substantive rights, these facts cover a set of ‘circumstances relevant for 
deciding on the merits of the case’.102 The Draft Bill describes this set of facts as ‘pieces of 
information necessary for revealing the particular circumstances of factual allegations’.
A mere reference to the existence of the exigency of alleging facts is not enough for 
the application of the rules related to it, but no taking of evidence is expected in that regard. 
  98 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
  99 Commentary to section 184 of the Draft Bill.
100 New CCP, section 184, subsections (1)–(2): exigency of alleging facts.
101 Légrádi, (2014) 469–70.
102 Névai and Szilbereki (1974) 297.
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The Draft Bill obliges the party who seeks to refer to the exigency of alleging facts to partly 
make its existence probable and partly verify its existence.
The exigency of alleging facts has been recognised in the courts’ case-law as well 
under the term of the reversal of the burden of proof.103 ‘If the exact cause behind the 
injured party’s health damage cannot be determined, the court has to examine all the 
possible causes that are related to the hospital’s activities, and in the event that the hospital 
is unable to prove that it has fulfilled its duty of care in respect of the possible causes, then 
the hospital’s liability for damages can be established. If the medical activity related cause 
of the injurious situation cannot be excluded, then the burden of proof is reversed and the 
defendant hospital has to prove that it has complied with its duty of care regarding the 
possible causes or that the injury could not have been avoided even if it had fulfilled its 
duty of care’.104
‘In a legal action for damages, it is sufficient for the relatives of a person who died 
during medical treatment to prove in relation to the cause and effect relationship that the 
person died during or right after the end of a medical treatment provided by a health-care 
institution. The latter is exempted from the liability for damages if it proves that it has 
fulfilled its duty of care, expected of health-care institutions and that the patient’s death 
could not have been avoided. In the event that the health-care institution, by failing to carry 
out an expected medical examination, deprives itself of the possibility of proving that it 
could not have avoided the injurious situation even in the possession of a correct diagnosis 
and even with the use of an appropriate medical therapy, then it cannot be exempted from 
its liability for damages’105. In order to be exempted from liability, the defendant medical 
service provider bears the burden of proving that, despite the service provider’s medical 
treatment in compliance with professional standards and the principle of due care, the 
plaintiff’s health damage could not have been avoided.106
The above case-law indicates that, in abnormally information-asymmetric situations, 
the courts have exempted the ‘weaker’ party from alleging and proving those facts that 
would have been necessary for the ‘weaker’ party’s successful litigation, and they have 
instead placed the burden of proof on the opposing party.107
The exigency of providing evidence occurs when ‘it is impossible to provide full 
evidence […], but the relevant facts are highly likely to be present, and the court’s 
conscience is not in favour of strictly applying the rules on the burden of proof…’108
Certain exigencies of providing evidence are properly regulated by substantive legal 
norms via the reversal of the burden of proof, e.g. by establishing presumptions and 
temporarily true allegations to be taken into account ex officio by the court.
The exigency of providing evidence may be applied if ‘the party under the burden of 
proof reveals that there is an exigency of providing evidence, and there is a certain 
likelihood (e.g. empirical rule) that his factual allegations are true. In the event that the 
other party is in the possession of convincing proof to the contrary, he is able to disaffirm, 
without too much difficulty, the above factual allegations’.109
103 Király and Simon (2005) 143–86.
104 EBH 2009.1956. 
105 BDT 2008.1801. 
106 BDT 2010.2355., BDT 2010.2319., BDT 2007.1689.
107 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
108 Farkas and Kengyel (2005) 62.
109 Légrádi (2014) 211–26.
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The Draft Bill defines four situations in which the exigency of providing evidence may 
be applied.110
1. the data necessary for the evidence-seeking party to submit a motion for evidence is 
in the exclusive possession of the opposing party (or other person); 2. it is impossible for 
the party to provide evidence, but it would be expected from the opposing party to give 
evidence to disprove the party’s allegations; 3. it is at least likely that the opposing party 
has obstructed the taking of evidence, ‘in such situation, the opposing party, by way of 
disposing of the pieces of evidence, intentionally or negligently influences the outcome of 
evidence taking’111; 4. the party would be able to provide evidence only in an unlawful 
manner, and the opposing party does not give his consent to the use of such evidence, in 
this case, the opposing party who is not interested in the taking of evidence has a right of 
disposal over the means of evidence.
The legal consequences of the exigency of providing evidence can be avoided by the 
opposing party only if he makes it probable that (1) he or any other person not involved in 
the proceedings but having the same interests has never disposed and has never needed to 
dispose of the relevant data; (2) there is a third person who does not share the interests of 
the opposing party and also disposes of the relevant data; (3) the evidence-seeking party 
failed to make every effort which may reasonably be expected of him to obtain the necessary 
data or means of evidence (for instance, he could have done something else besides the 
actions he allegedly taken); (4) it is theoretically possible for the evidence-seeking party to 
produce evidence beyond the opposing party’s exclusive scope of control; (5) it cannot be 
reasonably expected from the opposing party to give evidence to refute the party’s 
allegations; (6) the taking of evidence has not been obstructed; (7) it was not him or any 
other person having the same interests who has obstructed the taking of evidence; (8) the 
evidence-seeking party failed to make every effort which may reasonably be expected of 
him to prevent, eliminate or mitigate the consequences of the obstruction of the taking of 
evidence; (9) the harm to be suffered by the opposing party in case of providing information 
or evidence, or giving his consent to the use of evidence would be disproportionately 
greater than the evidence-seeking party’s interests in the taking of evidence; (10) he has lost 
his right to dispose of the data and means of evidence required due to reasons beyond his 
scope of control; (11) the obstruction of the taking of evidence is not attributable to him.
This highly differentiated regulation serves the purposes of preventing the parties from 
being placed in an unfair procedural situation.
The notion of the scope of control was introduced into the Hungarian legal system by 
the 2013 Civil Code, the explanatory memorandum of which states the followings: 
‘Circumstances that cannot be controlled or influenced by the party (e.g. the traditional 
forms of vis maior) are beyond his scope of control. Such circumstances include natural 
disasters, certain politico-social events (war, revolution, uprising, sabotage, closure of 
transport routes or airports), certain State measures (import-export bans, foreign exchange 
restrictions, embargo, boycotts), serious disruptions of public services and those radical 
changes in the market conditions that make the performance of contractual obligations 
impossible (e.g. dramatic price explosion, significant lowering of the exchange rate of the 
currency used for payment, etc.). On the other hand, organisational and other disturbances 
at the level of the service provider, the adverse behaviour of employees, market supply 
110 New CCP, section 265, subsections (2)–(3): interests in producing evidence and exigency of 
providing evidence.
111 Légrádi (2014) 216.
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difficulties and other similar circumstances do not qualify as circumstances beyond the 
scope of control of the defaulting contractual party. The court has to weigh all the 
circumstances of the case at hand to decide on the issue whether the performance of services 
in conformity with the contract has been hindered by a circumstance beyond the party’s 
scope of control’.112 ‘The legal consequences of the exigency of providing evidence cannot 
be avoided, for instance, if the party alleges that he has lost his right to dispose of an 
otherwise irreplaceable piece of evidence due to burglary or theft, and he is even willing to 
prove the commission of such criminal offence by presenting the charges filed and the 
police report on the crime scene.
In the proceedings, the parties are not obliged to allege facts. The parties are free to 
allege those facts that, due to lack of common or official knowledge or of examination, the 
court is unfamiliar with. The Draft Bill defines the parties’ interests in alleging certain facts 
on the basis of which it determines which party is primarily expected to allege the facts 
necessary for the delivery of the court’s decision, more precisely, the interested party is 
expected, while the other party is allowed to do so.
The interests in alleging facts and the interests in producing evidence are different 
procedural legal terms, which also entails that if the party interested in alleging certain facts 
fails to allege them, he may remain interested in the taking of evidence related to them in 
case another person makes the necessary factual allegations.113
4.6. The rules on the methods of evidence taking and the means of evidence
The general rules on the methods of evidence taking and the means of evidence are 
contained separately in Part 4 of the new CCP. The methods of evidence taking are as 
follows: the hearing of witnesses, the taking of documentary evidence and inspection, while 
the means of evidence include the followings: witness, expert, documentary evidence, 
image and sound recording, material evidence, etc.
It is not clear from the provisions of the CCP in force e.g. whether the party’s legal 
representative is heard as a party or as a witness by the court, whether the party’s legal 
representative is entitled to make factual allegations orally instead of the party, or whether 
the factual allegation of the legal representative of a party that is not a natural person 
qualifies as a witness testimony or as the party’s factual allegation. The Draft Bill does not 
consider the statements made by the parties and their representatives as means of evidence, 
and differentiates between the parties’ factual allegations and the pieces of evidence learnt 
in the proceedings.114
The hearing of the legal representative of a party, being either a natural or a non-
natural person, does not qualify as the hearing of a witness, but is considered as the hearing 
of a party in person, and the court may order such hearing ex officio as well. As the 
representative’s factual allegations are not deemed to be different from the party’s factual 
allegations, the court treats the diverging allegations of several persons (party and 
representative) as if the statements of the same person, the party himself had been dissonant 
or self-contradictory.115
112 Commentary to subsection 6 section 142 of the New Hungarian Civil Code.
113 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
114 Commentary to section 279, subsection (1) of the Draft Bill. Regarding the party as a means 
of evidence and the assessment of his personal statement as a piece of evidence, see more Varga and 
Légrádi (2014) 491–93.
115 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
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By virtue of the principle of the free establishment of facts, not only those methods of 
evidence taking can be used that are expressly defined by the law, but other, non-defined 
(atypical) methods can be utilised as well (e.g. requesting information from the relevant 
authorities and private organisations, carrying out experiments, replaying past events 
referred to in the proceedings, commissioning opinion polls, etc.).116 The Draft Bill 
introduces, as an innovation, the notion of collaborators who provide assistance in 
appropriately carrying out the taking of evidence, for instance, the court requests information 
about certain relevant facts from the authorities or private organisations. Due to the 
extension of the scope of application of coercive measures to all collaborators, the court is 
able to enforce compliance with the requests for information.117
5. SUMMARY
The Draft Bill does not entail fundamental changes in the system of civil procedural law. 
It seeks to retain the well-established instruments, but ‘the introduction of new rules should 
be of significant benefit, otherwise the well-established legal provisions are to be maintained 
instead’.118 The codification of the new Code of Civil Procedure is in conformity with the 
legal premise of Ulpian only if it does not fall victim to the compulsion to over-regulate and 
[…] the litigants are able to enforce their claims within a transparent, simple, fast-track and 
clear procedural framework.119
 The most important questions are whether the Draft Bill will facilitate the participation 
of legal professionals and citizens seeking justice in civil proceedings and promote the 
provider’s approach of the courts, whether the litigants will be able to enforce their claims 
within a transparent, simple, fast-track and clear procedural framework, and whether the 
new Code of Civil Procedure will be able to ensure the simple and efficient enforcement of 
claims and to strengthen public confidence, the courts’ prestige and the rule of law?
I agree with Tünde Handó, the President of the National Office for the Judiciary, in 
that the introduction of scientifically over-complicated legal institutions120 (that are 
understandable almost exclusively by those who have a bar exam) did not serve the above 
purposes, and the legislator forgot about the litigants. Another predictable consequence of 
the over-complex wording of procedural rules is that the non-professional parties will 
misinterpret them, and they will need to be clarified, counselled and informed about them, 
which will make the proceedings unnecessarily burdensome.121
116 The Experts’ Draft Proposal (manuscript), 2015.
117 Commentary to section 271 of the Draft Bill.
118 Digesta, IV. cfm–De constitutionibus principum, 2., Ulpianus. See the observations of the 
President of the National Office for the Judiciary, Mrs. Tünde Handó in respect of the draft proposal 
on the new Code of Civil Procedure, April 2016, 2014.OBH.XXII.C.1.1./164., attachment no 1.
119 Letter of the President of the National Office for the Judiciary, Mrs. Tünde Handó addressed 
to Minister of Justice Mr. László Trócsányi, President of the National Office for the Judiciary, 2014.
OBH.XXII.C.1.1./164., 12 April 2016.
120 By virtue of Recommendation Rec(81)7 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe on measures facilitating access to justice, the use of strange terminology, unduly complex and 
too technical expressions should be avoided and the language used should be comprehensible 
(principle 5 on the simplification of procedural acts).
121 The observations of the President of the National Office for the Judiciary (2016) as in note 
118.
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The codification of the new Code of Civil Procedure primarily results from the 
adoption of the new Civil Code and from the need to align the procedural rules on non-
litigious proceedings, increasing in quantity and importance with the Procedural Code, 
secondarily, it stems from social pressures, the most overwhelming of which is to prevent 
the backlog of court cases.122 To address the issues raised by legal practitioners, the drafters 
had to take into account the courts’ procedural law related case-law and the needs of other 
legal professions as well.123
It can be observed in all the re-codified procedural codes of the continental Europe that 
they strengthen the role of judicial activism, however, they may regulate its intensity and 
extent differently.124 Judicial activism aims to ensure compliance with the international 
requirement of the concentration of proceedings, which is emphasised by various 
international documents, including the 2006 recommendation of the European Commission 
for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) of the Council of Europe, according to which the 
court should play an active, case-managerial role in civil proceedings. Judicial ‘inactivism’ 
is heavily criticised in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.125 The finding 
of Géza Magyary made more than one hundred years ago has remained true to date 
regarding part of the civil proceedings of the last few years. He found that ‘as the parties 
had been given full freedom to determine the procedural steps of the proceedings, the taking 
of evidence was not carried out in sufficient depth and the conclusion of the case was 
significantly delayed.’126
‘In the past 20 years, disputes over the necessity of the substantive measures of 
organisation of procedure have accompanied the various modifications of the CCP. Until 
1995, the principle of officiality, expressed in the requirement of ensuring the discovery of 
substantive truth, the possibility of taking evidence ex officio and the obligation to provide 
extensive information had been strongly emphasised in civil proceedings. By contrast, the 
1995 modification of the CCP accentuated the parties’ right of due and unbiased process, as 
well as their right to dispose of their legal action by declaring the exceptional nature of the 
ex officio evidence taking and by restricting the court’s obligation to provide information. 
Subsequently, the introduction of the provisions of section 3, subsection (3) of the CCP127 
led to the extension of the court’s role in the organisation of procedure’.128 The main sources 
of tension due to the diverging social, legal policy and dogmatic objectives of civil 
proceedings originate from the conflict between substantive truth and procedural truth and 
between judicial activism and the parties’ right to dispose of their legal action.129 The judge 
do not say at the party, what should be asked for in order to fulfill the court’s request, just 
122 Cserba (2013)11.
123 Varga (2013) 489.
124 E.g. strengthening the court’s role in determining the material framework of the legal 
dispute, which is summarised in the form of the substantive measures of organisation of procedure. In 
Commentary to section 6 of the Draft Bill.
125 Commentary to section 6 of the Draft Bill.
126 Magyary (1898) 901.
127 Regarding an approach on the court’s obligation to provide prior information on the basis of 
section 3, subsection (3) of the CCP, see more Döme (2014) 393–416.
128 Letter of the Head of the Civil Department of the Curia addressed to the President of the 
National Office for the Judiciary (2015) as in note 42.
129 Virág (2014) 362.
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tells him if the request can not be accepted in the given form, which fits to the support of 
the early completion of the process.’
The new CCP reiterates that the main objective is the impartial adjudication of cases, 
which is to be achieved by ensuring the effectiveness of proceedings, strengthening the 
parties’ obligation to tell the truth within a fair trial, introducing a split system of proceedings 
and the court’s contributive actions, obliging both parties, as a general rule, to be represented 
by a legal representative (the high courts’ model), regulating the means of electronic 
communication and strengthening the parties’ right to dispose of the taking of evidence.
The most important innovations of the Draft Bill are the implementation of the 
principle of the concentration of proceedings and the introduction of the split system of 
procedural phases. ‘In the split system, there is a preparatory phase aiming at determining 
the framework of the legal dispute and there is an on-the-merits phase with evidence taking. 
The courts’ jurisprudence shows that the protraction of proceedings is often and mainly due 
to the fact that the CCP in force does not restrict or only partially restricts the modification 
of the statement of claims, allows the defendant to essentially limitlessly modify his defence 
in the first instance proceedings and allows the parties to submit their pieces of evidence 
and motions for evidence at almost any time’.130 The implementation of the principle of the 
concentration of proceedings can be ensured only if the taking of evidence is under the 
court’s control and not under the parties’ control, as they may be interested in the protraction 
of proceedings, while the court is obliged to render a lawful and well-founded decision 
within a reasonable time and with regard to the principle of cost efficiency.
The preparation of the court’s hearing is one of the most critical phases of civil 
proceedings, as only a thorough preparation can guarantee the success of the hearing and 
the shortening of the duration of proceedings.131 The preparation of the hearing should have 
a threefold function: the preparation of the taking of evidence related to the facts of the 
case, the assessment of whether the case can be adjudicated without holding a hearing and 
the promotion of the conclusion of an out-of-court settlement by the parties.132 This 
preparatory phase is based on the taking of evidence, which should not be limited to 
criminal and civil proceedings, since it is an essential procedural element in any proceedings 
that aim to establish facts and verify allegations.133 The establishment of facts has an 
enormous importance for the well-foundedness of the court’s judgement, in addition, a fast/
efficient establishment of facts enables the court to deliver its decision within a shorter 
period of time. The establishment of facts can also promote the conclusion of an out-of-
court settlement by the parties, which renders the holding of additional hearings unnecessary.
During the examination of the topic of the taking of evidence, I had been concerned 
about the issue of what are the parties’ true expectations from the judicial system and to 
what extent the legislator is able to live up to them. The parties expect from the courts to 
reveal the truth in order to provide compensation for the damage suffered by them, and the 
new CCP seeks to meet this social expectation within the framework of the parties’ factual 
allegations. The issue of whether the parties’ allegations are true is of essential nature in the 
proceedings, and based on their assessment the court should deliver a just (true to the facts) 
judgement. Following the court’s judgement, the case adjudged – on the basis of the legal 
130 Commentary to section 214 of the Draft Bill.
131 Farkas and Kengyel (2005) 112.
132 Czoboly (2013).
133 Kengyel (2014) 282.
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premise of Ulpian – must be taken for truth.134 The new regulation aims to ensure the 
implementation and enforceability of those procedural requirements that are related to the 
objective of evidence taking (the court has to become convinced of the veracity of the 
parties’ allegations) and the parties’ interests in the taking of evidence (the parties seek to 
convince the court).
In my opinion, it is regrettable that in the codification process no emphasis has been 
placed on the role of declarations on oath (or solemn pledge), which could, in today’s world 
drifted into moral crises, provide court hearings with a solemn quality, moral strength and a 
more formal framework. Oaths or pledges would have a much needed psychological effect 
on the declarants’ conscience, and they should be applied to all the participants to 
proceedings.
Modern procedural laws have increased the level of requirements applied to plaintiffs 
based on the assumption that defendants should not be obliged to meet the same formal 
requirements and be subjected to the same sanctions. With regard to the above, the parties’ 
obligation to assist the court in administering justice as defined in the Draft Bill cannot be 
understood from a defendant’s perspective. Requiring defendants to defend their position in 
an active manner would lead to the restriction of the parties’ right to dispose of their legal 
action, declared as a basic principle and the misinterpretation of the principle of the equality 
of the parties. In civil proceedings, the parties and, in particular, defendants cannot be 
expected to do other than make factual allegations to the best of their knowledge.135 
To address this problem, the Draft Bill introduces a number of new provisions at the level 
of district courts to facilitate the enforcement of claims by litigants without legal 
representation, e.g. it introduces the application of forms, lowers requirements on the 
parties’ submissions and provides assistance for the parties by way of the court’s broader 
scope of substantive measures of organisation of procedure.136
The rules on the taking of evidence in the new CCP essentially aim to align the legal 
provisions in force with the newly established split system of procedural phases and to 
codify the courts’ existing case-law, at the same time, they clarify certain notions, for 
instance, the principle of free evidence taking is replaced by the principle of the free 
establishment of facts, while the notion of the obligation to provide evidence is substituted 
by the parties’ interests in evidence taking. A substantial change is the regulation of the 
involvement of private experts, and the questions arises as to how the courts will cope with 
the problem that the opinion of a private expert commissioned by the party (the details of 
commissioning not being known to the court) and the opinion of a forensic expert 
commissioned by the court will have the same evidentiary force.
Finally ‘what can be the most primitive and simplest method to accelerate civil 
proceedings? The increase of the number of judges. Problems should not always be 
addressed by re-regulation, but sometimes by the appropriate assessment of existing 
conditions’.137
134 Res iudicata pro veritate accipitur. Ulp. D. 50, 17, 207. See in the Observations of the 
President of the National Office for the Judiciary (2016) as in note 118.
135 Observations of the President of the National Office for the Judiciary (2016) note 118.
136 Observations of the President of the National Office for the Judiciary (2016) note 118.
137 Ferenczy (2015) 92.
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